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The paper analyzes the contribution of public capital to private output using several meta-
analytical techniques. Both fixed and random effects models are estimated by Weighted Least 
Squares. Sample overlap across studies is explicitly controlled for by employing a ‘full’ 
Generalized Least Squares estimator. The weighted average output elasticity of public capital 
amounts to 0.08 after correcting for publication bias. A substantial part of the heterogeneity 
across studies is explained by study design parameters, such as econometric specification, 
estimation technique, empirical model, type of public capital, and level of aggregation of 
public capital data. The large elasticities of public capital found in the early literature seem to 
be caused by either unidentified (but present) cointegrating relationships or spurious 
relationships in national time series. 
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1 Introduction
Discussions among academics and policy makers about the contribution of the public capital
stock to private output growth have been ongoing during the last two decades. Recently,
these debates have revived within the European Union (EU), following the renewed interest
in fiscal policy rules—in the form of ceilings on the deficit-to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP
ratios—and their potential negative impact on public capital formation. Indeed, in many
instances, policy makers find it easier to cut back on infrastructure investment rather than
on current expenditure. To provide input to the public capital debate, it is of importance to
have insight into the stylized facts on the linkage between private output and public capital
formation.
Many authors have tried to determine the contribution of public capital to private output
by estimating a production function that includes the public capital stock as an input (the
so-called production function approach). Aschauer (1989a, 1989b, 1990) was one of the
first to investigate this issue for the United States in an attempt to explain the productivity
growth slowdown in the 1970s.1 Indeed, in the United States and various OECD countries,
investments in the public capital stock fell and aggregate labor productivity growth declined
slightly later. Aschauer (1989a) found that a 1 percent increase in the public capital stock
increased private output by 0.39 percent, suggesting that public capital is an important
determinant of output. Since then, many studies have been undertaken for the United States
and various other OECD countries. More recently, attention has also been focused on the
productivity effects of public capital in developing countries (e.g., Ram, 1996). The findings
of these studies generally range from no significant effect to a strongly positive effect of public
capital on output. Some studies, though not that many, even find significantly negative
results. So far, researchers have not attached much priority to reconciling these differences.
Although various authors have reviewed the literature on the productivity of public cap-
1Mera (1973) was the first to estimate a production function including some form of public capital, which
he refers to as ‘social capital,’ for nine Japanese regions. This work was followed by work of Ratner (1983)
and Da Costa, Ellson, and Martin (1987).
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ital,2 none of them has applied a systematic meta-analysis yet.3 The aim of the paper is to
fill this gap. Drawing on Stanley and Jarrell (1989) and Stanley (2001), meta-analysis can
be defined as a body of statistical methods to summarize, evaluate, and analyze empirical
results across studies. A problem with conventional reviews of the literature is that studies
are difficult to compare, owing to differences in the empirical model, econometric specifica-
tion, estimation method, and data definitions. Meta-analysis presents a more systematic and
objective way to summarize empirical results. It allows us to explain the wide study-to-study
variation by the researcher’s choices made on research design in the analysis. In this way, a
meta-output elasticity of public capital can be derived, which researchers and policy makers
can use in their analyses without conducting any empirical research themselves.4
Our meta-sample pertains to studies employing public capital as an input into production.
The sample covers all relevant studies up to and including the year 2006, yielding a meta-data
set of 76 studies. Instead of using all available observations, we include a single observation
per study, which allows us not only to control for dependency across multiple observations
taken from a single study, but also to increase—by focusing on the highest quality estimates
only—the accuracy of the true effect estimate. We compute both fixed and random effects
estimates of the true underlying output elasticity while controlling for publication bias. In
contrast to the work of Stanley (2005), we explicitly test for bidirectional publication bias
that is potentially asymmetric.
Besides a simple meta-analysis, we conduct a more complex meta-regression analysis. We
test for a large set of potential determinants of heterogeneity across studies. We estimate
a fixed and random effects meta-regression model using Weighted Least Squares (WLS). In
the fixed effects specification, the equation is multiplied by the inverse of the within-study
2See the studies by Munnell (1991, 1992), Gramlich (1994), Pfahler et al. (1996), Button (1998), Sturm et
al. (1998), Button and Rietveld (2000), Mikelbank and Jackson (2000), IMF (2004), and Romp and De Haan
(2007).
3We are aware of only one study, that of Button (1998), who has made a first (but very incomplete) attempt
to explain observed heterogeneity across studies on public capital. Button’s (1998) meta-regression analysis
covers only 26 studies (published during 1973–1994), which yields a meager total of 28 data points. He finds
one significant moderator variable, that is, whether a study pertains to the United States.
4Meta-analysis has a long-standing tradition in psychology and medical research. Environmental and trans-
port economists were the first to apply meta-analysis in economics in the 1980s. Since then, it has been picked
up by other fields in economics such as labor economics (e.g., Card and Krueger, 1995), industrial organization
(e.g., Button and Weyman-Jones, 1992), and international economics (e.g., De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003; and
Rose and Stanley, 2005).
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standard deviation. In the random effects specification, however, we use the sum of the within
and between variation as weights. We control for dependency of estimates across countries by
including country-fixed effects and correct for heteroscedasticity by employing White standard
errors and also clustering of standard errors.
Our methodological innovation is that we account for the degree of sample overlap in a
random effects model by using a ‘full’ Generalized Least Squares (GLS) procedure. Note that
the WLS procedure—which is a stripped down version of GLS, which we call ‘partial’ GLS—
leaves unused information on the error-covariances of the original estimates. Because various
authors make use of identical or very similar samples, thus creating sample-dependency across
estimates, the off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix are non-zero. We em-
ploy a simple procedure to calculate the degree of sample overlap, which is subsequently used
to proxy error correlation. The error variances, in turn, are derived from the standard errors
of the original estimates. By weighting the original measurements by the variance-covariance
matrix obtained in this manner, a full GLS estimator is obtained. We show that a substantial
amount of heterogeneity across studies is explained by study design characteristics such as
the econometric specification, estimation technique, empirical model, type of public capital
used, and level of aggregation of public capital data.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses definitions,
presents various approaches used to estimate the output elasticity of public capital and dis-
cusses empirical results. In addition, it gives an overview of the criticisms launched against the
most widely used methodology, that is, the production function approach. Section 3 describes
the meta-sample and presents the meta-analysis results. Section 4 discusses and estimates
publication bias and applies a publication bias correction to our meta-analysis. Section 5 sets
out the meta-regression model and discusses the meta-regression results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Public Capital and Private Output
How do we define and measure the public capital stock? Which approaches exist to measure
the productivity of public capital? What size of the output elasticity of public capital do
3
empirical studies typically find? This section addresses these important questions before it
ventures into a review of the methodological issues.
2.1 Defining Public Capital and Output
Gramlich (1994, p. 1177) defines infrastructure capital from an economic point of view as
‘large capital intensive natural monopolies such as highways, other transportation facilities,
water and sewer lines, and communications systems.’ Although most of these systems are
publicly owned, in some cases they are privately owned. For example, a firm that constructs its
own road to connect itself to the main highway. The literature generally defines infrastructure
capital based on ownership. It is the public component of infrastructure capital that most
people have in mind when they talk about public capital. The issue of definitions is more
subtle, however.
Most empirical studies employ a ‘narrow definition’ of public capital that includes the
tangible capital stock owned by the public sector excluding military structures and equipment.
More specifically, it consists of core infrastructure (i.e., roads, railways, airports, and utilities
such as sewerage and water facilities), hospitals, educational buildings, and other public
buildings. Some authors use a ‘broad definition’ of public capital by also including human
capital investment (e.g., Garcia-Milà and McGuire, 1992), or health and welfare facilities
(e.g., Mera, 1973). The latter components are hard to measure, explaining why most authors
focus on the narrow concept of public capital.
To arrive at an estimate of the stock of public capital at a particular moment in time,
researchers determine an initial value of the capital stock to which they add gross investment
flows and subtract technical depreciation of the existing capital stock (based on the expected
life spans of its components).5 The majority of studies employ public capital stocks defined
at the national level including all levels of government (e.g., Aschauer, 1989a), whereas oth-
ers deal with capital stocks estimated for regions (e.g., Garcia-Milà and McGuire, 1992).
Some studies only consider capital that is owned by local governments (e.g., Evans and
Karras, 1994a), which does not take into account regionally installed capital owned by the
5See Sturm and De Haan (1995) for further details on this so-called perpetual inventory method.
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central government. We are aware of only a few studies estimating capital stocks at the
city/metropolitan level (e.g., Duffy-Deno and Eberts, 1991; and Kemmerling and Stephan,
2002).
The measure of output—which is used as the dependent variable in the econometric anal-
ysis, see Section 2.3—varies across studies. Most studies use either real net output of the
private sector (e.g., Ratner, 1983)6 or real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—or, alternatively,
real Gross State Product (GSP), when the data is at the state level for the United States—
exclusive of public sector output (e.g., Finn, 1993). Because government output is typically
not exchanged on markets, it is hard to measure. In the National Accounts, it is equated
to the wage bill of the public sector. Although we are primarily interested in measuring the
contribution of public capital to private output rather than total output, not every study em-
ploys a measure of output that corrects for public sector production. The latter is typically
the case of studies using data for emerging markets or developing countries, where the only
available measure of output is total GDP (e.g., Ram, 1996).
2.2 Empirical Methodologies
The literature has distinguished various approaches to study empirically the link between
private output and public capital. The production function approach, which is the most widely
known and applied, considers the stock of public capital either as a separate input in private
production (which we call the ‘pure production function approach’) or as a factor affecting
multifactor productivity (which is known as the growth accounting approach; see Hulten and
Schwab, 1991b). In both cases, public capital is assumed to be strictly exogenous. Evidently,
because the growth accounting approach does not yield direct estimates of the output elasticity
of public capital, it will not be covered in our empirical analysis. Closely linked to the
production function approach is the production frontier approach, which departs from the
former by taking into account that public capital may increase potential production without
necessarily increasing actual production (e.g., Delorme et al., 1999). In an efficient steady
state, the production frontier approach is equivalent to the standard production function
6Net output (which equals gross value-added) is obtained by subtracting the value of intermediate goods
and services from gross output of the private sector.
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approach. We take this distinction into account in our empirical analysis.
Another methodology is the Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach, which analyzes the
relationships between public capital, private inputs, and private output without imposing a
theoretical structure. The multi-equation VAR approach models every endogenous variable
as a function of its own lagged value and the lagged values of the other endogenous variables
and thus can assess whether there is any feedback from private sector variables to the public
capital stock. We do not include pure VAR studies in our analysis because in this framework
it is hard to disentangle the direct effect (i.e., the production elasticity) from the feedback
effects. Some authors (e.g., Ligthart, 2002), however, employ Johansen’s (1988) method—
which makes use of the VAR technique—to check whether the variables in the production
function are cointegrated (see Section 2.5). The latter studies will be included in our sample.
Other approaches are the following two. The cross-country growth regressions approach,
which specifies a reduced-form equation to estimate—using cross-section or panel data—the
relationship between per capita private output growth and the public investment-to-GDP
ratio. The growth regressions approach should be distinguished from those studies explic-
itly embedding a production function in the framework (which we will call the ‘production
function-based approach’). We will classify the latter under the production function approach
if an output elasticity of public capital is or can be derived. Last but not least, the behavioral
approach—coined as such by Sturm et al. (1998)—which employs cost or profit functions to
assess whether public capital reduces firms’ production costs or increases firms’ profits. This
last approach does not specify a direct relationship between public capital and private output,
so it will not be covered in the empirical section.
2.3 The Production Function Approach
The corner stone of the production function approach is a technological relationship that
incorporates the stock of public capital at time t, denoted by Gt, as an input:
Yt = AtF [Kt, Lt, Gt] , (1)
where Yt is real aggregate private output within some area (region or country), At is an index
of economy-wide productivity, Kt denotes the stock of (non-residential) private fixed capital,
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and Lt denotes employment (typically measured by total hours worked). Equation (1) shows
that public capital may affect aggregate real private output in two ways. First, a direct effect,
that is, ∂Yt/∂Gt > 0. The idea is that the services of public capital are proportional to the
stock of public capital—which is generally assumed to be a pure public good—and contribute
to production in that way. Second, public capital may raise the marginal productivity of
private factors of production, that is, ∂2Yt/(∂Kt∂Gt) > 0 and ∂2Yt/(∂Lt∂Gt) > 0.
Most studies employ a Cobb-Douglas production function:7




t , α, β, θ > 0, (2)
where θ ≡ ∂ lnYt/∂ lnGt is the output elasticity of public capital, which is hypothesized to be
positive. This specification models public capital and private inputs as cooperative factors of
production. By taking natural logarithms on both sides of (2), we get a linear relationship:
lnYt = lnAt + α lnKt + β lnLt + θ lnGt. (3)
Equation (3) can readily be estimated in logarithmic (log) levels or first differences of log
levels (i.e., growth rates) to arrive at estimates of α, β, and θ. As can be seen from (3),
the productivity index enters the equation in an additive way. Following Ratner (1983),
many studies include a constant and a time trend as a proxy for technological progress (i.e.,
lnAt = a0 + a1t, where a0, a1 > 0).
Incorporating public capital into the production function raises the issue of returns to
scale in production. Imposing the restriction of constant returns to scale (CRTS) across all
inputs, which is represented by α+β+θ = 1, yields the specification employed by the majority
of studies:
ln(Yt/Kt) = lnAt + β ln(Lt/Kt) + θ ln(Gt/Kt). (4)
Equation (4) features decreasing returns with respect to private inputs taken together.8 In-
stead of using private capital productivity, ln(Yt/Kt), some studies subtract lnLt from both
7Some studies use the more general translog production function, which includes also quadratic and inter-
action terms for each input. Early adopters of the translog specification are, amongst others, Merriman (1990),
Pinnoi (1994), and Damalgas (1995).
8An alternative model assumes CRTS in both private inputs (represented by α + β = 1; see Mas et al.,
1994), allowing for increasing returns to scale across all inputs (i.e., α+ β + θ > 1).
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sides of (3) and impose CRTS so as to arrive at the logarithm of labor productivity as the
dependent variable.
2.4 Some Empirical Results
The output elasticity of public capital can be used to derive the marginal productivity of
public capital, that is, ∂Yt/∂Gt = θ(Yt/Gt), which equals the effective rate of return on
public capital.9 To assess whether investments in public capital are worthwhile, policy makers
generally compare the marginal productivity of public capital with the marginal productivity
of private capital, which equals the real rate of interest in a competitive market.
Gramlich (1994) argues that the rate of return on public capital derived by Aschauer
(1989a) is too large to be credible. Indeed, depending on the year of measurement of (Y/G)t,
returns vary between 60 to 80 percent. The marginal output gain of an additional unit
of private capital estimated from Aschauer’s equation amounts to 30 percent, suggesting a
difference between public and private capital of a factor two to three. Aschauer (1990) points
to the high rate of return found in R&D studies to justify the large output elasticities found
in the early literature. Gramlich (1994) claims, however, that a large share of public capital
is directed at less productive sectors of the economy, such as waste and pollution abatement,
which is likely to contribute little to national output. There is no reason to be pessimistic
about the empirical evidence. First, studies published in the 1990s find more realistic values
of the output elasticity of public capital. Second, most studies find a positive and statistically
significant output elasticity of public capital. Indeed, Ligthart (2002) derives an unweighted
average of the output elasticity of public capital of 0.25 for OECD countries if the production
function is estimated in logarithmic levels.
The first author studying the output effect of public capital in a regional context is Mera
(1973), who analyzes nine Japanese regions, employing a broad definition of public capital.
Since then, various authors10 have found elasticities at the regional level that are much smaller
9Here it is assumed that public capital is remunerated based on its marginal productivity. Aaron (1990)
argues that in the presence of government pricing inefficiencies and the absence of markets for government
services this is not a very realistic assumption.
10Munnell (1990b), Eisner (1991), Garcia-Milà and McGuire (1992), Evans and Karras (1994a), and Holtz-
Eakin (1994).
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than those from analyses using aggregated data for a single country. This can be attributed to
spillover effects, that is, some of the beneficial effects of public capital accrue to neighboring
regions. In a Nash equilibrium, these spillovers are not internalized, so that both regions may








j,t, η > 0, (5)
where Gi is the public capital stock of the home region i, Gj is the public capital of the
neighboring region j, and η > 0 is the spillover effect. On the significance of the spillover
effect, however, no consensus has emerged in the literature yet. Studies by Holtz-Eakin and
Schwartz (1995a, 1995b) and Boarnet (1998) find little evidence of spillover effects. Indeed,
studies at the aggregate level measure only the net effect. Backwash effects, such as congestion
and resource exploitation, or displacement effects (i.e., new infrastructure shifts economic
activity to other locations) may exceed any positive gross benefits of infrastructure.
The composition of the public capital stock matters for its effect on private production.
Core infrastructure is more productive than other types of public capital, such as educational
and office buildings and hospitals. Accordingly, empirical studies employing a broad definition
of public capital (which necessarily includes less productive components), find a lower θ than
studies focusing on core infrastructure (cf. Sturm and De Haan, 1995; and Ligthart, 2002).
2.5 Criticisms of the Production Function Approach
Various authors have criticized Aschauer’s model for being misspecified due to the omission
of relevant variables. Tatom (1991) makes a case for including energy prices in the production
function to account for supply shocks. For example, the rising oil prices of the 1970s may have
depressed capital use. Gramlich (1994) criticizes Tatom’s approach for mixing production
functions and cost functions. Instead of including energy prices, a measure of the quantity
of energy use in production should be employed. The study by Vijverberg et al. (1997), for
instance, includes imported raw materials in the production function.
Another specification issue concerns the modeling of the effect of the business cycle on fac-
tor use. For this purpose, some studies incorporate a capital utilization rate—or, alternatively,
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the unemployment rate—in the regression equation.11 Because authors use log-linearized em-
pirical models, capacity utilization enters in an additive fashion. Consequently, it affects all
factors across the board, which is a restrictive assumption. Some studies, for example, Rat-
ner (1983), have already adjusted the data and thus do not add a separate regressor. The
majority of studies, however, do not correct for the business cycle. If one is interested in
estimating long-run elasticities of output with respect to factor inputs, then it makes sense
to disregard business cycle effects (e.g., Nourzad, 2000; and Ligthart, 2002). Instead, the
aim of most studies is to estimate short-run elasticities of production. Not controlling for the
business cycle in this case is likely to bias the estimates downwards.
Some of the early studies have been criticized for not properly accounting for common
trends. Generally, time series on GDP and the public capital stock contain a unit root
or, in other words, they are non-stationary. If variables are non-stationary, the usual test
statistics have nonstandard distributions, implying that the application of standard inference
procedures gives rise to misleading results. In particular, one may find spurious relationships
between outputs and inputs. Some studies have, therefore, proposed to eliminate time trends
in variables by taking first differences.12
Two criticisms were raised against first differencing. First, the growth rate of private
output in a particular year is not strongly correlated with the growth rate in the public
capital stock during that same year as lagged effects are likely to be important. Moreover,
equations estimated in first differences often yield implausible coefficients for private inputs
(see Sturm and De Haan, 1995). Second, by first differencing information on a possible
long-run equilibrium relationship between a set of non-stationary time series (in which case
variables are cointegrated) may be thrown away. This shifts the focus of the analysis away
from the long-run effects of public capital to the short-run effects. Instead of first differencing,
the variables should be tested for cointegration. In the mid-1990s, various authors have either
employed Engle and Granger’s (1987) cointegration test or Johansen’s (1988) variant of this
test, giving rise to mixed results.
11For example, Aschauer (1989a), Hulten and Schwab (1991a), and Sturm and De Haan (1995) were early
adopters of this specification.
12See, for example, Aaron (1990), Tatom (1991), and Sturm and De Haan (1995).
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Equations (1)–(4) assume Gt to be strictly exogenous, implying that causality runs from
public capital to private output. Some authors (e.g., Munnell, 1992; and Gramlich, 1994)
have pointed to the lack of attention paid to feedback effects. The direction of causality
may run from private output to public capital rather than the other way around. Indeed,
a higher rate of output growth may generate favorable budgetary conditions (via higher tax
receipts), which facilitate an increase in public investment. During the last decade, various
authors13 have employed VAR models with a view to capturing the dynamic interactions
between output, public capital, and private capital.
Some authors solve the endogeneity problem by using a more traditional econometric tool,
namely the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator. The choice of instrumental variables is
usually not an easy task, but in a time-series or panel data context lags of the independent
variables emerge as natural instruments to be employed. If a positive effect running from
output to public capital exists, then Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of θ in a single
equation model like (3) or (4) are known to be exaggerated. Therefore, IV estimates are likely
to be smaller than OLS estimates. Baltagi and Pinnoi (1995), for instance, use panel data for
the United States to arrive at a pooled OLS estimate of θ = 0.16; the reported IV estimate
of θ, however, is only 0.02.
3 Meta-Analysis
This section provides a description of the meta-data set and conducts a simple meta-analysis
with a view to assess a meta-output elasticity of public capital.
3.1 The Meta-Data Set
Table A.1 (see Appendix) shows the set of studies reporting estimates of the output elasticity
of public capital using (or based on) the production function approach.14 In total, 76 studies
13McMillin and Smith (1994), Otto and Voss (1996), Batina (1998), Flores de Frutos et al. (1998), Pereira
and Roca Sagales (1999), Sturm et al. (1999), Ligthart (2002), and Pereira and Roca Sagales (2003) amongst
others.
14Studies dealing with translog production functions were ignored. Converting the estimated parameters to
a single output elasticity is not straightforward. Trying to obtain the relevant standard errors is an even more
daunting task.
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were coded and included in the meta-data set. To obtain a sample of studies representative
of the true population, we used a variety of searching methods.15 We started by checking the
references in the overview papers of Sturm et al. (1998) and Romp and De Haan (2007), which
together provide a very comprehensive coverage of relevant papers up to 2004.16 From these
sources, we obtained 55 usable references.17 We then searched for papers citing Aschauer
(1989a) in Thomson’s Web of Science, which allowed us to add eight papers to our meta-data
base. We also used the Internet search engine Google Scholar and searched for words such as
‘public capital’ and ‘public infrastructure,’ each in combination with ‘output’ or ‘productivity,’
which yielded another 13 papers (of which six are working papers). Roughly 18 percent (14
out of 76) of the papers are unpublished. Out of 51 published papers, six are published in
top-20 journals (based on the ranking of Kodrzycki and Yu (2006)). The data set encompasses
single-country studies for 13 different countries and 10 cross-country analyses.
The issue of how many estimates to include in the meta-data set when each study reports
more than one is still a controversial issue. Some authors claim that all available estimates
(referred to as ‘measurements’) should be included (e.g., Bijmolt and Pieters, 2001), whereas
others are strong believers of selecting only one measurement for each study (e.g., Stanley,
1998; and Van der Sluis et al., 2005). Including all measurements from each study raises two
problems. First, it creates dependency among measurements taken from a single study, which
we call ‘measurement dependency.’ Note that dependency across studies may also be present
because some studies rely on identical or very similar data sets (which we refer to as ‘sample
overlap,’ see Section 5). Second, studies with a large number of measurements would receive a
disproportionate weight in the sample, giving rise to sampling bias (cf. Stanley, 2001). In our
sample, the total number of data points is 706, yielding an average number of 9.3 per study.
However, the distribution of available data points across studies is highly skewed. The four
papers with the largest number of estimates account for 112 estimates (16 percent of total),
the first 10 papers report 243 estimates (34 percent) and the top half of the ranked sample
15See White (1994) for a review of the general procedures for searching and retrieving papers.
16In addition, we also checked the overview papers by Pfahler et al. (1996), Button (1998), Mikelbank and
Jackson (2000), and IMF (2004).
17The initial data base of studies was much larger. Not all studies could be included owing to missing
standard errors, which are a key input into the analysis.
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yields 623 estimates (88 percent). Aschauer’s (1989a) study reports the largest number of
estimates (36 in total), thus receiving a weight six times larger than studies reporting only
one estimate (of which only six are included in the sample).
Aside from statistical considerations, there is a more fundamental reason why we include
only one measurement per study, that is, we want to measure ‘the’ true output elasticity of
public capital (either measured in a fixed or random effects context). To uncover the value
of this parameter as accurately as possible, only those measurements that come closest to
the true effect should be used. In each study no more than one measurement can reasonably
meet this criterion. Often, the authors themselves consider many of their estimates senseless,
which can therefore be discarded upfront.18
To address these issues, we include only one measurement for each study, which raises the
issue of selecting a measurement from multiple measurements. In a few cases, the authors
come up with what they consider their ‘preferred estimate.’ More often than not, however, the
choice of the measurement is not clear-cut. In such cases, we apply a set of predefined selection
rules. We let consistency prevail over efficiency and pick the estimate that results from the
most sophisticated econometric method (cf. Stanley, 1998). For instance, IV is preferred
over OLS estimation and panel fixed effects are considered to be superior to pooled OLS
and panel random effects. When the disaggregation of total public capital in subcategories
proves significant, we select the broadest category. Finally, we choose the estimate from the
most parsimonious model as long as the imposed restrictions are not rejected statistically.
Following Stanley (1998), when multiple measurements still remain, we average across them.
Consequently, we also need to average any moderator variable we want to include, which
makes it harder to interpret the coefficients derived from a meta-regression.19 In view of this,
we use this strategy only in a few cases in which differences in estimates are caused by study
characteristics that are not included in our set of moderator variables (see Section 5).
Estimates in our sample vary from −0.175 to 0.917, with an arithmetic (or ‘simple’)
18Take panel data studies as an example. For comparison purposes, researchers typically report pooled OLS,
random effects, and fixed effects estimates. If the fixed effects model is statistically preferred, as is often the
case, then both OLS and random effects estimates are inconsistent. Unless the sole objective of the meta-
analysis is to explain the heterogeneity created by the use of different statistical methods, these inconsistent
estimates should obviously not be used in a meta-analysis.
19Some studies (e.g., Rosenthal, 1991) average across all measurements.
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average of 0.193 and a standard deviation of 0.198, showing quite some variation. Indeed, we
expect a substantial amount of variation given that studies differ along several dimensions.
Eight studies find negative estimates, whereas 68 report positive coefficients. We find that
the median of 0.159 is smaller than the sample average; thus the distribution is asymmetric,
potentially indicating publication bias. Restricting our analysis to 65 papers applying the
pure production function approach does not change the results much. Only when we exclude
papers reporting possibly spurious estimates20 do the mean and median (0.178 and 0.140,
respectively) slightly decrease, though total and average variation remain large.
3.2 Pooling Estimates
When pooling estimates to arrive at a ‘meta’-estimate, the issue of the degree of homogeneity
of the estimates needs to be addressed. Two approaches to deriving a meta-estimate of θ can
be distinguished. The first approach is the fixed effects model, which assumes that all studies
are estimating a common true effect. More formally, denoting the estimate reported in each
study in the meta-sample of size N by θ̂i, and the unknown population (or ‘true’) effect that
is estimated by θi, we can write:
θ̂i = θi + µi, for i = 1, ..., N, (6)
where µi is the sampling error satisfying E(µi|θi) = E(µi) = 0 (where E denotes the expec-
tations operator) if each estimate, θ̂i, is unbiasedly estimating θi. The conditional variance
of θ̂i is defined as V (θ̂i|θi) = V (µi) (which represents the within-study variance), whereas its
unconditional counterpart is V (θ̂i) = V (θi) + V (µi). If all studies are estimating a common
true effect (i.e., θ0 = θi for all i) then the conditional and unconditional variances of θ̂i are
equal (i.e., V (θ̂i) = V (µi)). In other words, all variation is due to sampling error. The ran-
dom effects model assumes that θi is drawn randomly from an iid(θ0, σ2θ) distribution, where
σ2θ is the between-study variance (reflecting heterogeneity across studies). The unconditional
variance of θi then becomes: V (θ̂i) = σ2θ +V (µi). Intuitively, the total variability of estimates
across studies is composed of pure heterogeneity and sampling error.
20An estimate is considered to be potentially spurious if an equation is estimated in levels without testing
for a cointegrating relationship.
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For the fixed effects model it suffices to estimate θ, whereas for the random effects model






which is a weighted average of the sample estimates, θ̂′is, where the w
′
is are weights. Although
θ̄ is an unbiased and consistent estimator of θ for any choice of weights, there is only one
estimator minimizing its variance, that is, wi = 1/V (θ̂i) (see Hedges, 1994). Intuitively, more
precise estimates receive more weight when averaged. In the fixed effects model, V (θ̂i) =
V (θ̂i|θi), so that the weights are calculated from the standard errors of θ̂i. In the random
effects model, however, the weights are given by wi = 1/[σ2θ + V (θ̂i|θi)].21 Obviously, the
simple mean is just a specific case of (7), where the weights are chosen to be the same and
equal to 1/N .
Which model is preferable? On statistical grounds the question reduces to testing whether
σ2θ is statistically different from zero. If σ
2
θ = 0, then estimates differ from each other only due
to sampling error, which suggests that a fixed effects model should be preferred. However, if
σ2θ > 0, then a random effects model is called for. Because studies differ along several dimen-
sions (i.e., functional specification, econometric technique, definitions of aggregate output and
public capital variables, etcetera), sampling error is unlikely to be the sole factor of variation.
Consequently, the random effects model becomes the more plausible candidate in our case. A













which under the null hypothesis of homogeneity is χ2N−1 distributed.
The left panel of Table 1 reports the estimates of θ for both fixed and random effects models
and their 95 percent confidence bounds. For the whole meta-sample of 76 reported estimates,
the fixed effects estimate of θ is 0.092, less than half of that obtained using a simple average.
The true effect is between 0.088 and 0.097 with 95 percent confidence, implying that θ = 0 can
be rejected. The Q-test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of homogeneity, suggesting that
21Note that σ̂2θ = [Q− (N − 1)]/c, where c ≡
∑N






i=1 wi) and Q is defined in (8). Note














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































we should employ the random effects model. In this model, the estimate of θ becomes 0.152,
featuring a confidence interval of [0.129, 0.175]. Note that the confidence interval is now much
wider, because under random effects the variance of θ̄ reflects not only sampling variation but
also the term σ2θ . The estimate of θ hardly changes for the restricted sample that includes
pure production function studies only. If potentially spurious results are also excluded the
random effects estimate is 0.144, which is somewhat smaller than the estimate for either the
complete sample or the pure production function. This apparently counterintuitive result is
explained by the contribution of the heavily weighted (but small) estimate of 0.059 by Otto
and Voss (1996), which is coded as a possibly spurious result.
Table A1 reveals three studies with extremely small values for the standard errors, namely,
Garcia-Milà and McGuire (1992), Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993), and Otto and Voss
(1996). Consequently, these studies carry a large weight in the meta-analysis. If these mea-
surements were excluded, we would find fixed and random effects estimates of 0.121 and
0.160, respectively. Consequently, the value of θ̄ would rise by not more than 5 percent in the
random effects model, suggesting that outliers are not a serious problem.
4 Publication Bias
If fixed and random effects estimators are both consistent for the population effect θ, why is
it that they produce such different estimates of the effect size? A possible explanation is that
they are differently contaminated by publication bias, to which we will turn now.
4.1 The Nature of Publication Bias
Publication bias means that journals are more likely to publish studies reporting statisti-
cally significant results. Papers reporting insignificant results are either not submitted for
publication (i.e., self-censoring by the author(s)) or are rejected by the editors/referees (i.e.,
censoring by peers). Even though papers are not published in academic journals they may
still be available as Working Papers and unpublished reports. Some authors (cf. Begg, 1994)
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of publication bias. But even though it may reduce publication bias somewhat, it cannot
be completely eliminated. Indeed, self-censoring by authors may be quite pernicious, which
prevents them from making their findings available altogether.
Is there publication bias in our sample? To get an informal answer, we employ a funnel plot
depicting the inverse of the standard error on the vertical axis and the estimated effect size
on the horizontal axis. In the absence of publication bias, estimates should lie symmetrically
around the true effect. The plot should look like an inverted funnel, which is wider at the
bottom than at the top. Intuitively, estimates based on small samples are usually less precise
and are therefore located further away from the true effect. The top panel of Figure 1
shows that estimates tend to concentrate on the right-hand side of the funnel, suggesting
unidirectional publication bias (also known as type I selection bias; see Stanley, 2005). We
also notice that the base of the funnel is rather wide, potentially indicating bidirectional
publication bias (so-called type II selection bias). The bottom panel of Figure 1 presents an
alternative funnel plot, which now measures the standard error on the vertical axis and adds
95 percent confidence bounds. It can be seen that roughly half of the data points appear to
lie outside the 95 percent bands. Positive (negative) estimates seem to increase (decrease)
with the standard errors, indicating that publication bias may be bidirectional.
4.2 Publication Bias Tests
We can formally test for the magnitude of publication bias while at the same time providing
evidence of a genuine output effect of public capital. The starting point is equation (6),
which is modified to include the standard error of each estimate (se(θ̂i)) as a regressor with
a view to estimating publication bias. We set up our model in a general way so as to be
able to capture both fixed and random effects specifications. To differentiate the models, we
introduce λi ≡ θi − θ0. The fixed effects model (cf. Card and Krueger, 1995) assumes λi = 0
so that θi = θ0, whereas the random effects model specifies λi ∼ iid(0, σ2θ). We now get:
θ̂i = θ0 + λi + δse(θ̂i) + µi, (9)
where θ0 is the true output effect and µi is the error term. As discussed above, if publication
selection is plaguing the meta-sample, then we should observe some relationship between
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the estimates and their standard errors, that is, δ 6= 0. In the absence of publication bias,
estimates will lie symmetrically around the true value θ0, which implies δ = 0.
The error term µi in (9) is heteroscedastic given its obvious dependence on se(θ̂i). In this
context, OLS estimation yields inefficient (but consistent) estimates of θ and δ. In the fixed
effects model, se(θ̂i) provides a natural estimate of µi. Hence, we can divide both sides of (9)
by se(θ̂i) to arrive at a study’s standardized effect (i.e., the t-value) on the left-hand side of
the equation. In other words, we multiply equation (9) by wi ≡ 1/se(θ̂i).22 In the random
effects model, we apply wi ≡ 1/
√
V (ei) + σ2θ to both sides of (9). Estimating the weighted
version of (9) by OLS produces WLS estimates of θ0 and δ, which are consistent and efficient.
Stanley (2005) assumes symmetric publication bias and therefore takes absolute values of
the left-hand side of the weighted fixed effects version of (9) to accommodate bidirectional
publication bias, that is, θ̂i is expected to be positively (negatively) correlated with se(θ̂)i
when θ̂i is positive (negative). The more general version of Stanley’s specification captures
both fixed and random effects:
wi|θ̂i| = wi
[
θ0 + λi + δse(θ̂i) + µi
]
. (10)
Equation (10) forces the bidirectional publication bias to be symmetric, in which case δ does
not depend on the sign of θ̂i. It would be useful to test this restriction. Let us specify a more
flexible model, in which asymmetric bidirectional publication bias is permitted:
wiθ̂i = wi
[
θ0 + λi + δpDpise(θ̂i) + δnDnise(θ̂i) + µi
]
, (11)
where Dpi (Dni) is a dummy variable that equals one if θ̂i > 0 (θ̂i < 0) and zero otherwise.




Dpi(θp + λpi + δpse(θ̂i)) +Dni(θn + λni + δnse(θ̂i)) + µi
]
, (12)
where true effect uniqueness requires imposing the condition θp = θn = θ0.
22Note that in Section 3.2 the inverse variance approach was used in weighting the measurements instead
of using wi ≡ 1/se(θ̂i). In terms of estimators, both weighting schemes are identical. Suppose we premultiply
(9) by a N ×N weighting matrix T , which features the inverse of a study’s standard errors on the diagonal.
Applying OLS to this equation gives the vector of estimates (including θ0): δ = [se(θ̂)
′Ω−1se(θ̂)]−1se(θ̂)Ω−1θ̂,
where Ω−1 ≡ T ′T and Ω is the variance-covariance matrix. The matrix Ω−1 has the inverse of the variances
on the diagonal.
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Table 2: Fixed Effects: True Effect Tests and Linear Publication Bias Correction
Equation (9) (10) (12) (11) (11′)
θ0 0.068 0.066 – 0.064 0.064
(0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)***
[0.018]** [0.018]*** [0.019]*** [0.016]***
θp – – 0.064 – –
(0.020)***
[0.019]***
θn – – 0.009 – –
(0.031)
[0.010]
δ 1.915 2.246 – – 2.536
(0.522)*** (0.482)*** (0.371)***
[0.519]*** [0.487]*** [0.407]***
δp – – 2.565 2.576 –
(0.507)*** (0.499)***
[0.529]*** [0.524]***
δn – – −1.381 −2.353 –
(0.634)*** (0.527)**
[0.261]*** [0.588]***
R2 0.356 0.371 0.707 0.706 0.706
N 76 76 76 76 76
Q-statistic – 864.71 817.20 819.33 819.64
σ̂2θ – 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
F -tests:
δp = −δn White – – – 0.06 –
(0.80)
δp = −δn Cluster – – – 0.06 –
(0.81)
θp = θn White – – 2.24 – –
(0.14)
θp = θn Cluster – – 5.31 – –
(0.03)**
DoF-tests:
γ1 0.106 0.020 −0.037 0.011 0.007
(0.106) (0.104) (0.113) (0.113) (0.110)
[0.115] [0.130] [0.121] [0.122] [0.114]
R2 0.0126 0.0004 0.0014 0.0001 0.0000
Notes: The values in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust (or White) standard errors in the case
of estimates and p-values in the case of F tests. The values in brackets are clustered standard errors.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. The dependent variable
in the degrees of freedom (DoF) test is the logarithm of the t-statistic corrected for publication
bias. To save on space, the constant (γ0) of the DoF test is not reported.
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Table 3: Random Effects: True Effect Tests and Linear Publication Bias Correction
Equation (9) (10) (12) (11) (11′)
θ0 0.085 0.089 – 0.087 0.081
(0.022)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.014)***
[0.024]*** [0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.014]***
θp – – 0.092 – –
(0.021)***
[0.025]***
θn – – −0.035 – –
(0.053)
[0.030]
δ 1.443 1.666 – – 2.066
(0.391)*** (0.349)*** (0.233)***
[0.379]*** [0.325]*** [0.214]***
δp – – 1.872 1.943 –
(0.356)*** (0.347)***
[0.352]*** [0.348]***
δn – – −0.680 −2.399 –
(0.793) (0.534)***
[0.394]* [0.618]***
R2 0.589 0.715 0.748 0.742 0.741
N 76 76 76 76 76
F -tests:
δp = −δn White – – – 0.37 –
(0.54)
δp = −δn Cluster – – – 0.28 –
(0.60)
θp = θn White – – 5.01 – –
(0.03)**
θp = θn Cluster – – 6.68 – –
(0.02)**
DoF-tests:
γ1 0.066 0.057 −0.022 0.088 0.103
(0.082) (0.103) (0.112) (0.110) (0.119)
[0.087] [0.100] [0.116] [0.117] [0.124]
R2 0.0082 0.0036 0.0005 0.0082 0.0093
Notes: The values in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust (or White) standard errors in the
case of estimates and p-values in the case of F tests. The values in brackets are clustered standard
errors. The Q-statistic and σ̂2 can be found in Table 2. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent level, respectively. The dependent variable in the degrees of freedom (DoF) test is
the logarithm of the t-statistic corrected for publication bias. To save on space, the constant (γ0)
of the DoF test is not reported.
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An alternative way to test whether a genuine empirical effect exists is to relate a study’s
t-value to its degrees of freedom (df):
ln
∣∣∣∣∣ θ̂∗ise(θ̂i)
∣∣∣∣∣ = γ0 + γ1 ln dfi + µi, (13)
where θ̂∗i is θ̂i corrected for publication bias and γ0 and γ1 are parameters to be estimated. If
we cannot reject the hypothesis that γ1 = 0, then either the true effect is zero or publication
bias is too severe. A genuine empirical effect implies γ1 = 1/2 (cf. Card and Krueger, 1995).
4.3 Estimation Results
Tables 2–3 present the estimates of the true effect and the size of publication bias of fixed
effects and random effects models, respectively. Besides White standard errors, which correct
for identified heteroscedasticity, we present clustered standard errors. For this purpose, we
have defined 27 clusters (see Appendix A.1 for a description). The results show, however, that
clustering does not affect our results much.23 Column (1) estimates equation (9), yielding
θ = 0.068 in the fixed effects model and θ = 0.085 in the random effects model. Both are
highly significant. As indicated by the significant value of δ—and suspected from Figure 1—
publication bias proves to be very significant in both models. Intuitively, even studies with
very small sample sizes—and thus high standard errors of the estimates—manage to find a
high enough θ such that a significant result is obtained. The fixed effects specification yields
a larger parameter for publication bias than the random effects model. Not surprisingly,
the estimate of δ with symmetric publication bias imposed (see column (2)) turns out to be
significant in both models. Imposing symmetry raises the publication bias coefficient slightly.
Column (3) shows that the estimated true effect for positive estimates, θp, is positive,
highly significant, and very much in line with previous estimates of θ. Perhaps more surpris-
ingly, the estimate of θn is also positive in the fixed effects model, though not statistically
different from zero, suggesting that negative estimates in the meta-sample are very likely to
be just the result of a mixture of pure chance and publication selection. In the random effects
model, θn is negative, but again insignificant. Column (4) imposes a symmetric true effect
23Clustering of measurements makes more of a difference in the meta-regression analysis of Section 5.
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and shows estimates of positive and negative publication bias parameters, δp and δn, which
appears quite symmetric; the F -test of the hypothesis δp = −δn is not rejected. The hy-
pothesis that publication bias is unidirectional (i.e., δp = δn) is naturally rejected (the F -test
statistic is not reported). Imposing symmetric publication bias and true effect uniqueness
(which we label (11′), see column (5)) does not change the point estimate of θ much, but
increases the magnitude of publication bias somewhat.
Estimating (13) without publication bias correction yields an insignificant value of the γ1
coefficient in both models (results are not reported), for which three potential explanations
exist. First, a genuine empirical effect may be absent. The second reason is the presence of
strong heterogeneity. Finally, γ1 can be insignificant because of substantial publication bias,
evidence of which has been presented above. To account for publication bias, we re-estimate
equation (13) with the left-hand side variable corrected for publication bias (see the bottom
panel of Tables 2–3). All γ′1s remain insignificant, however. Section 5 demonstrates that this
is caused by omitted variables.
We can now use the estimate of δ from the last column of Tables 2–3 to correct the meta-θ
for linear publication bias (see the right panel of Table 1). As compared to the case without
publication bias correction, the difference between fixed and random effects estimates narrows,
where the random effects estimates show a larger decline than the fixed effects estimates. As
before, the Q-test strongly favors the random effects estimator. For the entire sample, we find
a random effects meta-θ of 0.081, lying within the 95 percent confidence interval. Focusing
on studies using the pure production function only, does not affect the estimate of θ much,
whereas exclusion of VAR-based studies decreases it to 0.075.
5 Meta-Regression Analysis
The previous section showed that the true output elasticity of public capital is heterogeneous.
However, heterogeneity has not been explicitly modeled yet. This section employs a meta-
regression approach to find the determinants of the excess variation of estimates of the output
elasticity of public capital across studies.
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5.1 Methodological Framework
The starting point of the meta-regression model is the assumption that the true effect being
estimated depends on K study-specific factors. Table 4 provides the complete list of modera-
tors that are taken into consideration. In the context of symmetric bidirectional publication
bias, we employ an extended version of (12) capturing both fixed and random effects:
wiθ̂i = wi
θ0 + λi + M∑
j=1
φjDji + δse(θ̂i)(Dpi −Dni) + µi
 , (14)
where φ′js are estimated coefficients and Dji (for j = 1, 2, ...,K) is a dummy variable that
equals one if the i-th estimate is obtained from a study described by characteristic j and zero
otherwise. We include country dummies to control for dependency across measurements for
the same country. The dummies ensure that the within (and not the between) variation is
captured across estimates.24
We estimate equation (14) by OLS, using the weights defined earlier, which gives rise to
WLS estimates of the parameters. Because the latter do not take into account the covariances
across error terms they represent a partial GLS estimator. We apply a general-to-specific
approach to reduce the model to a parsimonious specification for two reasons: (i) many of
the moderator variables are not significantly different from zero; and (ii) the small number of
degrees of freedom (in our case 42) if all moderator variables are included. In each step of the
procedure, we delete the least significant moderator variable until we are left with a model in
which the variables are significant at least at the 10 percent level. Subsequently, we test for:
(i) the joint insignificance of the excluded variables; and (ii) publication bias symmetry.
Because of the relatively large number of studies on the United States (41 percent of
total), a few studies use identical data sets. For example, Munnell (1990b), Eisner (1991),
and Baltagi and Pinnoi (1995) all use data for the 1970–1986 period. Other studies on the
United States use slightly different sample periods, thereby yielding very similar data sets.
Overlapping data sets generate sample dependency. For some smaller European countries,
notably Italy and Spain, we also observe some overlap in data sets, again creating dependency
24We include country dummies Dji (for j = K + 1, ...,M) if there at least two measurements for a single











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Meta-Regression Results
Equation Partial GLS Full GLS
Fixed Effects Random Effects RE
White Cluster White Cluster White
θ0 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.125*** 0.127*** 0.086***
(0.008) [0.009] (0.017) [0.022] (0.036)
Developing -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.070*** -0.118*** -0.117***
(0.023) [0.023] (0.025) [0.024] (0.043)
Core 0.073** 0.073 0.085* 0.064 0.078*
(0.036) [0.049] (0.050) [0.069] (0.047)
Reg-loc 0.057** 0.057 0.066** 0.079** 0.075*
(0.025) [0.023] (0.030) [0.031] (0.044)
Transport – – – -0.051* –
[0.028]
Prox – – – 0.082** 0.103*
[0.031] (0.055)
Private – – – – -0.046
(0.027)
Reg-da -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.081*** – -0.119***
(0.018) [0.014] (0.027) (0.040)
Pfrontier 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.088** 0.075*** 0.132***
(0.029) [0.033] (0.037) [0.024] (0.049)
Gregr -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.092*** -0.171*** -0.148**
(0.015) [0.010] (0.023) [0.032] (0.057)
PF-based – – – -0.059** –
[0.024]
Trend -0.039* -0.039 -0.049* -0.045** -0.050*
(0.020) [0.026] (0.026) [0.020] (0.030)
Spurious 0.051* 0.051*** 0.060* 0.090*** 0.118**
(0.028) [0.016] (0.033) [0.016] (0.045)
Coint-all 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.105** 0.158*** 0.096***
(0.034) [0.043] (0.047) [0.036] (0.024)
Coint-VAR 0.066* 0.066 0.072 – 0.084**
(0.039) [0.047] (0.056) (0.038)
FE-levels 0.040* 0.040 0.039 – 0.059*
(0.021) [0.034] (0.027) (0.031)
IV-GMM – – – 0.028** –
[0.012]
CRTS – – – – 0.058**
(0.025)
δ 1.779*** 1.779*** 1.818*** 1.823*** 1.514***
(0.356) [0.390] (0.345) [0.375] (0.555)
R2 0.933 0.933 0.872 0.874 0.776
N 76 76 76 76 76
Q 186.455 186.455 – – –
σ̂2θ 0.001 0.001 – – –
F -tests:
δp = −δn 1.910 1.110 1.280 1.470 0.000
(0.173) (0.302) (0.263) (0.237) (0.999)
φ1 = ... = φX = 0 1.340 1.350 1.560 1.590 0.420
(0.235) (0.251) (0.141) (0.161) (0.929)
DoF tests:
γ1 0.350*** 0.350*** 0.286*** 0.286*** 0.301***
(0.102) [0.076] (0.075) [0.050] (0.103)
Notes: The values in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust (or White) standard errors
in the case of estimates and p-values in the case of F -tests. ***, **, * denote significance at
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. The random effects (RE) models (both partial
and full GLS) use the σ̂2θ obtained from the fixed effects partial GLS model. The second
F -test in the table tests whether or not X excluded variables are jointly insignificant. The
dependent variable in the degrees of freedom (DoF) test is the logarithm of the t-statistic
corrected for publication bias. See equation (13). To save on space, the constant (γ0) of the
DoF test is not reported.
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across studies. To address the sample overlap problem, we make use of full GLS estimation
(Appendix A.2), which is applied to the random effects model. The GLS estimator weights
the original measurements (our dependent variable) and the explanatory variables by a fully
specified variance-covariance matrix. The degree of sample overlap is used to recover the
off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix, which were assumed to be zero in the
analysis of Sections 4.2–4.3. Because the information that is used to construct the clusters
is basically the same as that needed to estimate the off-diagonal elements of the variance-
covariance matrix, we do not use clusters in applying the full GLS estimator.
5.2 Regression Results
The last column of Table 5 presents the regression results for the random effects model
estimated by full GLS, which we consider the benchmark model. The estimate of the true
output elasticity of public capital is 0.086, which is slightly larger than the value of 0.081
found in the true effect tests of Table 3. Note that the parameter θ0 is now measuring the
true effect conditional on a given set of study characteristics, whereas in (9) it measures the
unconditional true effect. Publication bias is significant and has the expected sign. It is,
however, much smaller than the value found in the true effect tests (compare column (5) of
Tables 3 and 5). The symmetry of publication bias could not be rejected. In general, the
publication bias parameter becomes more precisely estimated and rises slightly in size when
we impose the symmetry restriction.
We find 13 moderator variables that are significant (at least at the 10 percent level).
Six of these variables are related to the estimation method and econometric specification.
Studies allowing for a time trend find smaller output elasticities of public capital. A larger
estimate of θ is found for studies: (i) estimating a model in levels that is likely to be spurious;
(ii) including fixed effects in a levels specification; (iii) finding cointegration based on various
methods, such as Engle and Granger’s (1987) or Johansen’s (1988) method; and (iv) imposing
a CRTS restriction across all inputs. The coefficient of the Coint-all variable (measuring
a cointegrating relationship among variables using various methods) is very large; it even
exceeds the value of the conditional true effect. In addition, the coefficient of potentially
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spurious regressions (i.e., Spurious) is also large, partially explaining why the early literature
found unreasonably large estimates. Many of the latter papers may also contain unidentified
cointegrating relationships among the variables.
In line with the empirical partial results of Section 4.3, we find a significantly positive
coefficient for studies employing core public capital, implying that railways and airports are
more productive than public office buildings. In contrast, we find a significantly negative
coefficient for studies using regional data, supporting the presence of spillover effects at the
regional level that cannot be internalized at the national level. Public capital that is provided
by local/regional governments seems to be more productive than that at the national level.
Local governments apparently can better target public spending than national governments.
The coefficient of the Proxy variable is significantly positive at the 10 percent level. Studies
proxing public capital by the public investment-to-GDP ratio find larger output elasticities
of public capital.
The type of empirical model affects the results too. Studies employing growth regressions
yield smaller output elasticities than those employing a pure production function approach.
Intuitively, the former is quite flexible in terms of the set of explanatory variables, which may
include those variables that are strongly correlated with public capital.25 Consequently, some
of the variance of our dependent variable may be picked up by variables other than public
capital. Studies based on the production frontier approach yield larger coefficients, however.
The specification incorporates country dummies to control for country-specific effects.
Five of the nine country dummies (which are not reported) are significantly different from
zero. Surprisingly, the dummy for the United States—found to be significant in Button’s
(1998) study—is only significant at the 10 percent level. Countries that are larger in size
(in terms of surface area) seem to have smaller coefficients of the country dummies.26 The
dummy variable for developing countries is significantly negative, suggesting that the output
elasticity of public capital for this country group is lower than for industrialized countries. In
view of the typically low public capital-output ratios of developing countries, it is very likely
25Durlauf et al. (2005) argue that there is an abundance of potential growth determinants. Roughly 145
different proxies for growth determinants have been used in cross-country growth regressions.
26Regressing the estimated coefficients of the country dummies on the natural logarithm of country size
yields an estimated slope coefficient of -0.168 and a R2 of 0.44.
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that their public capital is contributing more to productivity than in industrialized countries.
The R2 of 0.78 shows that the model fits the data fairly well. Compared with the univariate
true effect tests of Section 4, the inclusion of moderator variables explains some additional
variation. Previously, some of this variation was picked up by publication bias, which plays a
larger role in the univariate true effect tests. The F -test of joint insignificance of the excluded
moderators cannot be rejected. Note that the degrees of freedom test now shows a significant
γ1 coefficient; it is not statistically different from 0.5 at the 5 percent level, providing evidence
of a true effect.
5.3 Robustness Analysis
Columns (1)–(4) of Table 5 show the results obtained by applying the partial GLS estimator
to the fixed effects and random effects models. Both regressions yield a larger true effect and a
larger publication bias coefficient than in the full GLS specification. In addition, R2 is larger
than in the full GLS specification. Apparently, more variation is attributed to publication
bias. Like before, we cannot reject the symmetry of publication bias. Dropping the country-
specific fixed effects from the equation with White standard errors does not affect the size of
the true effect. In the case of clustered errors, the true effect rises by 0.02 (fixed effects) and
0.01 (random effects) if the country-specific fixed effect is left out.
As compared with the full GLS specification, the set of significant moderator variables
changes somewhat in the random effects specification with clustered errors. Five moderator
variables are no longer significant: core public capital, regional data, Johansen’s cointegration
method, fixed effects estimation in levels, and the CRTS restriction. Three new significant
variables enter (i.e., transportation capital, production function based studies, and IV esti-
mation), potentially reflecting the effect of collinearity among the moderator variables.27 In
the fixed effects model with clustered standard errors, which is not our preferred specification,
even more variables drop out. Quite some overlap exists with the dropped variables in the
random effects model.
27Correlations above 0.75 were recorded between Private and CRTS, IV-GMM and Private, Private and
Spurious, Reg-da and the US dummy, Transport and the US dummy, and Spurious and the Australia dummy.
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6 Conclusions
This paper has assessed the output-elasticity of public capital by means of several meta-
analytical techniques, including meta-analysis and meta-regression analysis. A sample was
gathered of 76 studies focusing on the production function approach in a broad sense. The
estimates of the output elasticity of public capital were corrected for publication bias. In
the meta-regression analysis, both fixed and random effects models were estimated using
Weighted Least Squares (or partial Generalized Least Squares). To address sample overlap
across studies, a full Generalized Least Squares estimator was employed in the random effects
model.
Publication bias is shown to be substantial and significant in both the fixed and random
effects model of the simple meta-analysis. Moreover, publication bias appears to be bidirec-
tional and symmetric. The true output elasticity of public capital is positive and significant
no matter whether publication bias is corrected for. After correcting for publication bias, the
output elasticity of public capital in the (preferred) random effects model turns out to be
0.081 compared with 0.064 in the fixed effects model.
Heterogeneity across estimates of the output elasticity of public capital is predominantly
caused by differences in research design, such as the econometric specification, estimation
technique, type of empirical model, type of public capital, and aggregation level of public
capital. On the chosen estimation technique and econometric specification, the analysis in-
dicates that larger meta-output elasticities are obtained in studies featuring cointegration,
spurious relationships among variables, levels specifications estimated by fixed effects, and
constant returns to scale restrictions. Smaller meta-output elasticities are found in studies
employing time trends. The type of empirical model matters too. Production frontier studies
yield larger output elasticities, whereas growth regressions give rise to smaller estimates of
the output elasticity. On the kind of public capital and public capital data, the analysis in-
dicates that core public capital features a larger output elasticity than specifications drawing
on a more broadly defined concept of public capital. Studies employing regional data yield
smaller estimates of the output elasticity of public capital, whereas studies focusing on locally
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installed public capital find a higher output elasticity than those dealing with centrally owned
public capital.
Unlike Aschauer’s estimate of 0.39, the meta-regression analysis yields a reasonable meta-
output elasticity of public capital of 0.086 (which is slightly larger than the value found
in the univariate true effect test). This implies a marginal productivity of public capital
of roughly 17 percent in 2001.28 In that same year, the real long-term rate of interest—
which is assumed to reflect the marginal productivity of private capital in a perfect market—
amounted to 2.6 percent, suggesting that investment in public capital should be encouraged
from a macroeconomic point of view. In view of the above meta-regression results, the large
estimates found in the early studies seem to be caused by either unidentified (but present)
cointegrating relationships or spurious relationships among national time-series data.
Our analysis provides clear evidence in favor of public capital investment, but it is not
without limitations. The Cobb-Douglas production function, on which the majority of studies
is based, is quite restrictive. Extending the analysis by allowing for the much more flexible
translog function is certainly an improvement. A key issue here is that output elasticities of
public capital have to be calculated from the translog parameters. Although many studies
carry out such computations for the elasticities themselves, few do so for the standard errors.
Another fruitful research avenue is to combine the estimates from studies using the behavioral
approach, that is, cost and/or profit functions, with those of the production function. To the
best of our knowledge, such work has not been undertaken yet. Finally, in future work we
intend to correct our meta-estimate of the elasticity of public capital for nonlinear publication
bias.





In constructing the clusters, we took note of the following guiding principles. First, the
number of clusters must be as large as possible given the size of the data set. Some authors,
for example, Cameron et al. (2007), argue that at least 50 clusters are needed for accurate
inference. In that case, the cluster robust standard error converges to the true standard
error. Second, cluster sizes should be rather balanced. It would be natural to construct the
clusters on the basis of countries. Given that we have only 13 single country studies, differing
substantially in terms of the number of estimates, a small number of unbalanced clusters
would result. For instance, the United States alone would yield a cluster with almost half
of the sample, whereas many other countries would have one estimate only. In this context,
correcting the standard errors by cluster would probably do more harm than good.
To arrive at a sufficient number of clusters, we define various clusters within the same
country, especially for the United States. In defining the clusters, we use the degree of overlap
of the samples underlying the studies. We allocate studies to a single cluster if the degree
of sample overlap exceeds the pre-specified threshold of 80 percent. In a few cases (e.g.,
Ratner, 1983), we prefer to accommodate studies below the threshold in existing clusters
rather than to isolate them in a one-study cluster. We thus employ 27 clusters, ranging from
a minimum of one to a maximum of 14 estimates per cluster. On average, a cluster consists
of 2.8 observations.
A.2 The Full GLS Estimator
To arrive at the full GLS estimator, we start with the following random effects model:
θ̂i = θ0 + λi +
M∑
j=1
φjDji + δse(θ̂i)(Dpi −Dni) + µi, (A.1)
which can be written in compact form as:
θ̂ = Xψ + v, (A.2)
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where X is defined as:
X ≡

1 D11 ... DM1 se(θ̂1)(Dp1 −Dn1)






1 D1N ... DMN se(θ̂N )(DpN −DnN )

, (A.3)







































σu1uN σu2uN · · · σ2θ + σ2uN

, (A.5)
where σuiuj ≡ C(ui, uj) (where C stands for covariance) if i 6= j and σ2ui = V (ui) for i = j
because C(λi + ui, λj + uj) = C(ui, ui) = V (ui). The next step is to multiply both sides of
equation (A.2) by the weighting factor w ≡ 1/
√
Ω:
Ω−1/2θ̂ = Ω−1/2Xψ + Ω−1/2v, (A.6)
where E(Ω−1/2v) = 0 and V (Ω−1/2v) = Ω−1V (v) = Ω−1Ω = IN . Applying OLS to (A.6)
provides consistent and efficient estimates of ψ. Of course, the above procedure is only
operational if all elements of Ω are known or can be estimated.
The third step consists of estimating the elements of Ω. In doing so, we assume that
all sources of dependency across observations—except for sample dependency—have been
controlled for in the meta-regression. The elements of Ω on the main diagonal of (A.5) can
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be obtained in the same way as in Section 3.2. The formula differs slightly from that in
footnote 21:
σ̂2θ =















where σ̂2ui ≡ (se(θ̂i))
2 is defined as before and wi are the weights derived from the fixed
effects analysis. The off-diagonal elements are in some cases non-zero because there is sample




σ2uj , where ρuiuj is the correlation
coefficient between ui and uj . We thus need an estimate of ρuiuj . To this end, we define
ρ̂uiuj ≡ nij/(ni + nj + nij), where nij is the number of observations in overlapping samples i
and j (i.e., the samples that give rise to θ̂i and θ̂j) and ni (nj) is the number of observations
used to estimate θ̂i (θ̂j). If two samples do not overlap then ρ̂uiuj = 0, whereas if they
completely overlap then ρ̂uiuj = 1.
We do not make an attempt to recover estimates for the fixed effects model because: (i)
the random effects estimator is statistically preferred; and (ii) the fixed effects would require
imposing further restrictions on Ω. The latter argument can be illustrated as follows. If we
were to assume a fixed effects model, then σ2θ would drop out from the matrix Ω. In that
case, any two columns with ρuiuj = 1 (which assumes completely overlapping samples), would
yield a singular Ω matrix.
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Table A1. Studies Included in the Meta-Data Set




1 Ratner (1983)a US 0.277 0.099
2 Da Costa, Ellson, and Martin (1987) US 0.281 0.091
3 Aschauer (1989a) US 0.240 0.047
4 Aschauer (1989b) G-7 countries 0.410 0.130
5 Ram and Ramsey (1989) US 0.240 0.055
6 Munnell (1990a) US 0.330 0.066
7 Munnell (1990b) US 0.060 0.016
8 Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1991) US 0.081 0.031
9 Eisner (1991) US 0.077 0.031
10 Tatom (1991) US 0.042 0.127
11 Berndt and Hansson (1992) Sweden 0.687 0.220
12 Garcia-Milà and McGuire (1992) US 0.045 0.005
13 Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993) Spain 0.190 0.007
14 Finn (1993) US 0.158 0.077
15 Mas, Maudos, Pérez, and Uriel (1993) Spain 0.066 0.118
16 Munnell (1993) US 0.040 0.013
17 Prud‘Homme (1993) France 0.073 0.036
18 Eisner (1994) US 0.270 0.068
19 Evans and Karras (1994a) US −0.062 0.051
20 Evans and Karras (1994b) 7 OECD countries −0.175 0.107
21 Ferreira (1994) 67 countries 0.185 0.046
22 Holtz-Eakin (1994) US −0.022 0.131
23 Mas, Maudos, Pérez, and Uriel (1994) Spain 0.230 0.084
24 Otto and Voss (1994) Australia 0.381 0.143
25 Ai and Cassou (1995) US 0.174 0.024
26 Andrews and Swanson (1995) US 0.110 0.018
27 Baltagi and Pinnoi (1995) US 0.002 0.100
28 De la Fuentes and Vives (1995) Spain 0.212 0.064
29 Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995a) US 0.112 0.040
30 Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995b) US −0.007 0.025
31 Sturm and De Haan (1995) The Netherlands 0.780 0.275
32 Garcia-Milà, McGuire, and Porter (1996) US −0.058 0.075
33 Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) US −0.144 0.064
34 Khanam (1996) Canada 0.140 0.080
35 Mas, Maudos, Pérez, and Uriel (1996) Spain 0.086 0.025
36 Otto and Voss (1996) Australia 0.168 0.080
37 Ram (1996) 53 LDCs 0.135 0.047
38 Crowder and Himarios (1997) US 0.294 0.045
39 Kavanagh (1997) Ireland 0.144 0.298
(Continued on next page)
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40 Kelejian and Robinson (1997) US −0.023 0.064
41 Khan and Kumar (1997) 95 LDCs 0.290 0.090
42 Nazmi and Ramirez (1997) Mexico 0.129 0.028
43 Vijverberg, Vijverberg, and Gamble (1997) US 0.481 0.111
44 Boarnet (1998) US 0.257 0.052
45 Erenburg (1998) US 0.290 0.070
46 Flores de Frutos, Diez, and Amaral (1998) Spain 0.210 0.070
47 Moreno, Art́ıs, López-Bazo and Suriñach (1998) Spain 0.049 0.021
48 Nourzad (1998) US 0.340 0.200
49 Otto and Voss (1998) Australia 0.059 0.004
50 Ramirez (1998) Mexico 0.590 0.298
51 Cadot, Roller, and Stephan (1999) France 0.085 0.040
52 Delorme, Thompson, and Warren (1999) US 0.213 0.132
53 Picci (1999) Italy 0.501 0.032
54 Bonaglia, La Ferrara, and Marvelino (2000) Italy 0.305 0.043
55 Charlot and Schmitt (2000) France 0.317 0.021
56 Dessus and Herrera (2000) 28 LDCs 0.130 0.065
57 La Ferrara and Marcelino (2000) Italy −0.148 0.048
58 Nourzad (2000) 24 countries 0.529 0.107
59 Yamano and Ohkawara (2000) Japan 0.148 0.016
60 Yamarik (2000) US 0.088 0.032
61 Alonso-Carrera and Freire-Séren (2001) Spain 0.126 0.027
62 Owyong and Thangavelu (2001) Canada 0.917 0.194
63 Shioji (2001) Japan 0.241 0.062
64 Stephan (2001) Germany and France 0.112 0.040
65 Kemmerling and Stephan (2002) Germany 0.170 0.037
66 Ligthart (2002) Portugal 0.370 0.029
67 Rubio, Roldán, and Garcés (2002) Spain 0.040 0.018
68 Stephan (2003) Germany 0.537 0.134
69 Rodŕıguez-Valez and Yarias Sampedro (2004) Spain 0.160 0.029
70 Cantos, Gumbau, and Maudos (2005) Spain 0.042 0.016
71 Kataoka (2005) Japan 0.185 0.018
72 Kawaguchi, Ohtake, and Tamada (2005) Japan 0.180 0.160
73 Le and Suruga (2005) 105 countries 0.076 0.024
74 Berechman, Ozmen, and Ozbay (2006) US 0.035 0.019
75 Creel and Poilon (2006) 6 EMU countries 0.140 0.012
76 Kamps (2006) 22 OECD countries 0.221 0.060
Average 0.193 0.198
a The estimates considered are those replicated by Tatom (1991) using revised data for the same period. Ratner’s (1983)
original estimate amounts to 0.056.
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